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Abstract
We investigate the privatization policy of an industry where the production process generates
emissions. We show that the high degree of negative externality leads to production
substitution from the public firm to private firms. Moreover, we show that, if the degree of
negative externality is sufficiently high, then a mixed oligopoly is preferable to a pure
oligopoly for social welfare, even if the number of firms in the market is large. Furthermore,
we consider free entry of private firms.
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In many countries, including those in Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa, we can ob-
serve many mixed markets where state-owned public enterprises compete against private ﬁrms. The
privatization of state-owned public ﬁrms has been a worldwide trend since the 1980s, and most
governments in the abovementioned regions plan further privatization. In fact, in Japan, the priva-
tization of the postal services and postal bank was decided at an extraordinary session of the Diet
in 2005.
The studies on mixed oligopolies revealed that in an industry that is suﬃciently competitive (i.e.,
the number of ﬁrms in the market is suﬃciently large), privatization improves welfare. In fact, in
the early years, competitive sectors in many developing and developed countries were privatized.
However, in recent times, the sectors that are structurally complex, such as the energy industry and
the water industry, are beginning to be privatized. One of the features of such industries is that the
ﬁrm’s production activity often lead to environmental damage. In other words, the degree of negative
externality is high, and emission or pollution make the environment harmful for the residents of the
surrounding areas.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between privatization policy and
the negative externalities caused by production processes. In particular, we examine an eﬀect of
external diseconomy in the context of a mixed oligopoly, and argue about which industry should be
privatized. In our framework, N private ﬁrms and one state-owned public ﬁrm compete in Cournot
fashion. Both types of ﬁrms pollute the environment and produce homogeneous goods. The public
ﬁrm maximizes social welfare, and private ﬁrms maximize their own proﬁt. Due to the privatization
policy, the public ﬁrm’s goal changes from social welfare to the maximization of its own proﬁt. Since
the public ﬁrm’s goal is the social welfare, it considers the environmental damage. On the other
hand, private ﬁrms maximizes their proﬁt and ignores environmental damage.
We show that an increase in the degree of external damage causes production substitution from
the public ﬁrm to private ﬁrms. As a result, we ﬁnd that when emissions result in suﬃciently high
environmental damage, social welfare is hindered by privatization even if there exist a number of
private ﬁrms. We try to indicate a reason why a mixed oligopoly is better than a pure oligopoly
with suﬃciently high externality in the context of production substitution from the public ﬁrm to
private ﬁrms. Our result suggests that an industry having a high degree of negative externality
should not be privatized. Further, the privatization of an industry with a low degree of externality
may improve social welfare if the number of ﬁrms in the market is suﬃciently large. Moreover,
we consider free-entry of private ﬁrms. In the free-entry equilibrium, an increase in the degree of
negative externality does not aﬀect the equilibrium output of private ﬁrm and total output. We
show that a mixed oligopoly is preferable to a pure oligopoly if and only if the proﬁt of the public
ﬁrm is larger than the diﬀerence in damage between the mixed market and pure market.
We mention related literatures. First, our model is related to the vast literature on the studies of
mixed markets. The pioneering work of De Fraja and Delbono (1989) illustrates that the privatization
of public ﬁrms might improve welfare. Matsumura (1998) studies the partial privatization of public
ﬁrms, and provides a detailed explanation for the eﬀect of production substitution. Matsumura and
Kanda (2005) consider privatization policy under free-entry of private ﬁrms. Kato (2006) investigate
the eﬀects of tradable emission permits in a mixed oligopoly. Second, our motivation is related to
the studies of markets with externality since Meade (1952). Baumol and Oates (1988) gave the
comprehensive argument for this issue.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a mixed oligopoly model with
1externality. In Section 3, we show our comparative static result and the main result. We investigate
free-entry equilibrium in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper. The Appendix includes the
proofs of propositions.
2 The Model
We consider an industry in which N + 1 ﬁrms produce homogeneous goods. In the market there
is one state-owned public ﬁrm and N private ﬁrms that compete in quantities. The zero-th ﬁrm is
the public ﬁrm and its objective is to maximize social welfare. The remaining N ﬁrms are private
and seek to maximize their own proﬁt. We denote the inverse demand function by P(Q), where P
is the price, and Q is the total output. P(Q) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with P 0(Q) < 0.
We further assume that P 0(Q) + qP 00(Q) < 0. This is the standard assumption and guarantees the
stability of equilibrium: each ﬁrm’s best reply is downward sloping.1
In our model, the i-th ﬁrm’s technology depends not only on its output qi, but also on the amount
of emission ei. Therefore, the i-th ﬁrm decides its output level qi 2 R+ and the amount of emission
ei 2 R++. All ﬁrms have the same technology and the typical cost function is C(ei;qi).2 We assume
that C is continuous, Cq > 0, and Cqq > 0. This assumption is standard in this issue.3 Further,
we assume that Ce < 0 for 0 < ei < ¯ e and Ce > 0 for ei > ¯ e. That is, the cost C is decreasing in
ei for 0 < ei < ¯ e, and increasing in ei for ei > ¯ e. Assumptions on cross derivative are as follows:
Ceq = Cqe < 0 for 0 < ei < ¯ e and Ceq = Cqe > 0 for ei > ¯ e. This implies that the marginal cost Cq is
decreasing in ei for ei 2 0 < ei < ¯ e, and increasing in ei for ei > ¯ e.4 By our assumptions, each ﬁrm
has no incentive to choose ei > ¯ e. In this means, ¯ e is the maximum emission level.5
We measure the pecuniary environmental damage caused by the production activity by D(E;°),
where ° 2 R+, the total emissions E =
PN
i=0 ei, DE(E;°) > 0, D°(E;°) > 0, DE° = D°E > 0,
and DEE > 0. The parameter ° represents the degree of negative externality.6 Therefore, a large
value of ° indicates a strong external diseconomy in the industry, and we assume that D(E;0) = 0.
This implies that if ° = 0, there exists no externality in the market. We further assume that
Cee + DEE(E;°) > 0.





P(q)dq ¡ pQ +
N X
i=0






C(ei;qi) ¡ D(E;°) (1)
where Πi is ﬁrm i’s proﬁt.
1Precisely, this condition only implies that each private ﬁrm’s best reply is downward sloping. P0(Q) < 0 guarantees
that the public ﬁrm’s best reply is downward sloping.
2If the public ﬁrm’s cost function is diﬀerent from those of the private ﬁrms, we can obtain the same result of this
paper. For simplicity, we assume that both the public ﬁrm and private ﬁrms use identical technology.
3For example, see De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and Matsumura (1998).
4An example of cost function satisfying our assumptions is
C(ei;qi) =




where a > 0. The shape of this cost function is described in Figure 2 (pp. 11).
5We can also interpret ¯ e as the environmental standard prescribed by the government or a treaty.
6If D(E;°) = °d(E), where d0(E) > 0, we interpret ° as the social weight of environmental damage.
2We investigate two regimes: (i) mixed oligopoly and (ii) pure oligopoly. In a mixed oligopoly,
there exists one public ﬁrm, whereas, in pure oligopoly, the public ﬁrm is privatized and maximizes
its own proﬁt. In pure oligopoly, (N + 1) private ﬁrms with homogeneous technology compete
in quantities. Let W M and W P denote welfares in mixed oligopoly and pure private oligopoly,
respectively.
Note that if ° = 0, all ﬁrms including the public ﬁrm choose the highest technology, i.e., ei =
¯ e;8i 2 f0;:::;ng. In this case, our model corresponds to typical mixed oligopoly model such as
De Fraja and Delbono (1989). This implies that our model is the generalization of the standard
mixed oligopoly model. We suppose that W P > W M if ° is in the neighborhood of zero, and that
privatization is preferable. This assumption is not essential. Based on many papers on the mixed
oligopoly, it is known that if a market is suﬃciently competitive, this inequality is holds.7
3 The Results
Clearly, since private ﬁrms ignore environmental damage, then each of them chooses the maximum
emission level, i.e., ei = ¯ e;8i 2 f1;:::;ng. Thus, the reduced maximization problem of a private
ﬁrm is as follows:
max
qi
Πi subject to ei = ¯ e:






= 0 (public ﬁrm);
@Πi
@qi
= 0 for i = 1;:::;N (private ﬁrms):
The second order condition of private ﬁrms is also satisﬁed. Moreover, we assume that the
second-order condition of the public ﬁrm is also satisﬁed.9 We are interested in the equilibrium in
which the outcomes of private ﬁrms are symmetric, i.e., q1 = q2 =;:::;= qN. Let qs¤ denote the
equilibrium output of the public ﬁrm and qp¤ denote the equilibrium output of each private ﬁrm.
Furthermore, Q¤ denote the equilibrium total output.
As we mentioned earlier, the equilibrium emission level of private ﬁrms ep¤ is ¯ e. Moreover, by
the ﬁrst order conditions, the equilibrium emission level of the public ﬁrm, es¤, and the equilibrium
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¤;°) = 0: (4)
First, we present the following comparative static results.
7See De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and Matsumura (1998).
8In this paper, we focus on the interior solution of es¤. However, es¤ = 0 for large values of the parameter °, while
es¤ = ¯ e for small value. It is noteworthy that our result (proposition 2) is valid.
9The Hessian of the public ﬁrm’s objective is H =
µ
P0 ¡ Cqq ¡Ceq
¡Ceq ¡Cee ¡ DEE
¶
. The Hessian H is a negative
deﬁnite if and only if P0¡Cqq < 0 and (P0¡Cqq)(¡Cee¡DEE)¡Ceq2 > 0. By those assumptions, the former is satisﬁed.















The proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix. According to this proposition, an
increase in the exogenous parameter ° leads to production substitution from the public ﬁrm to
private ﬁrms. That is, when the exogenous parameter ° increases, the equilibrium output of the
private ﬁrms increases, and the public ﬁrm’s output decreases.
The intuition of this result is as follows. First, since the public ﬁrm considers environmental
damage, when the degree of externality (°) increases, it chooses a lower emission level. Second, since
choosing a lower emission level implies that the public ﬁrm’s level of technology relatively decreases,
the output of the public ﬁrm, in turn, decreases. Finally, the reply function of private ﬁrms is
downward sloping, and they increase their outputs. The key of this result is strategic substitute in
oligopolistic quantity-competition.
Next, we consider the important question about which industry should be privatized and will
obtain the answer by a simple proposition. To begin with, by a simple application of the envelope












= ¡D°((N + 1)¯ e;°): (6)
The following inequality is the suﬃcient condition of the single crossing property. Figure 1 shows






, D°((N + 1)¯ e;°) ¡ D°(N¯ e + e













Since es¤ 2 (0; ¯ e), by assumption, D°((N + 1)¯ e;°) ¡ D°(N¯ e + es¤;°) > 0. By proposition 1,
¡P 0(Q¤)qp¤N
dqp¤
d° > 0. Therefore, dWM
d° > dWP
d° holds.
We, now, present our main result as follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose that W p > W M for ° = 0. There exists °¤ such that W P < W M for
° > °¤, and W P > W M for ° < °¤.
This proposition contains a simple and important policy implication. Suppose that a market
is competitive and privatization is preferable when ° is suﬃciently low. However, if the degree of
negative externality is suﬃciently high (° > °¤), the government’s plan to privatize the public ﬁrm
reduces the total surplus. This suggests that when the government decides whether to privatize the
public ﬁrm, it must check the degree of negative externality (°). The industry in which a suﬃciently
high negative externality exists should not be privatized.
The intuition of this result is as follows. We should emphasize that there exist two eﬀects: a
direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect. The direct eﬀect is emission reduction by the public ﬁrm. In this






Privatization is better Mixed oligopoly is better
Figure 1: Welfare Comparison
eﬀect is production substitution from the public ﬁrm to private ﬁrms. The direct eﬀect (reducing
emission by the public ﬁrm) decreases the public ﬁrm’s output and increases private ﬁrms’ outputs.
In this case, production substitution occurs. Since the public ﬁrm is a welfare maximizer, a slight
decrease in q0 does not harm welfare, i.e., dW M=dq0 = 0. On the other hand, private ﬁrms maximize
their own proﬁt; therefore, dW M=dqi = P(Q¤)¡Cq(¯ e;qp¤) > 0 for all i 2 f1;:::;ng. Hence, a slight
increase in the production of private ﬁrm improves welfare. Therefore, production substitution from
the public ﬁrm to private ﬁrms improves the social welfare.
Note that the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (5) is positive, while the second
term is negative. The former is the eﬀect of production substitution, and the latter is the eﬀect of
environmental damage. In this sense, the direct eﬀect is relatively better for the social welfare, while
production substitution deﬁnitely improves welfare. To sum up, in a mixed oligopoly, an increase in
the degree of externality has two opposing eﬀects on welfare.10
4 Free-entry Equilibrium
In this section, we consider a mixed oligopoly with the free-entry of private ﬁrms. Precisely, we
consider the following game. We suppose that the entry cost of a public ﬁrm is sunk. In the ﬁrst
stage, each private ﬁrm chooses whether or not enter the market. In the second stage, each ﬁrm
entering the market independently chooses its output level and emission level.
The ﬁrst order conditions of ﬁrms is the same as Section 3. We are interested in the symmetric
equilibrium, q1 = q2 =;:::;= qN. Let qs¤¤, es¤¤, qp¤¤, Q¤¤, and N¤¤ denote the equilibrium output of
the public ﬁrm, the equilibrium emission level of the public ﬁrm, the equilibrium output of each pri-
vate ﬁrm, the equilibrium number of private ﬁrms, the equilibrium total output, and the equilibrium
number of private ﬁrms, respectively. In the free-entry equilibrium, the following equation must be
10In this paper, all ﬁrms have identical technology. When the public ﬁrm’s technology is diﬀerent from private’s






p¤¤ ¡ C(¯ e;q
p¤¤) = 0: (7)
Hence, qs¤¤, es¤¤, qp¤¤, and N¤¤ satisfy four equations (see equation (11), (12), (13), and (14) in the
Appendix).


















Proof of this proposition is in the Appendix. According to Proposition 3, the exogenous parameter
° does not aﬀect the equilibrium output of private ﬁrm and total output. That is, in the free-entry
equilibrium, the equilibrium output of private ﬁrm qp¤¤, and total output Q¤¤ are independent of °.
Remind that when the number of private ﬁrm is exogenous, an increase in the degree of negative
externality (°) lead to production substitution from the public ﬁrm to private ﬁrms. On the other
hand, when the number of private ﬁrm is endogenous, an increase in the degree of negative externality
(°) does not cause this production substitution eﬀect.
Lemma 3 (i) (ii) is related to Lemma 2 of Matsumura and Kanda (2005). They investigate
the eﬀect of partial privatization in the free-entry equilibrium. Lemma 2 of them says that the
equilibrium output of each private ﬁrm and total output is independent to the degree of partial
privatization.



































¡ D°(N¯ e + e
s¤¤;°)
where we use Proposition 3 (i) and equation (7).
Since DE > 0, D° > 0, and dN¤¤
d° > 0, we have the following simple result.
Proposition 4. dW MF=d° < 0.
By this proposition, an increase in the degree of negative externality (°) always damages social
welfare. When the number of private ﬁrm is exogenous, an increase in the degree of negative
externality (°) lead to not only a negative eﬀect but also a positive one on welfare. On the other
hand, in the free-entry equilibrium, this welfare-improving eﬀect does not exist. This is because an
increase in the degree of negative externality (°) does not cause production substitution from the
public ﬁrm to private ﬁrms.
Next, we discuss the eﬀect of the privatization policy in the long-run. Let W PF denote the
equilibrium welfare in the pure oligopoly with free-entry. EMF and EPF is the total emission level
in the mixed and pure market, respectively.
6Proposition 5. W MF > W PF if and only if Π0 > D(EMF;°) ¡ D(EPF;°).
In the long-run, a mixed oligopoly is preferable to a pure oligopoly if and only if the proﬁt of
the public ﬁrm is larger than the diﬀerence in damage between the mixed market and pure market.
This result is robust when the public ﬁrm’s technology is diﬀerent from private ﬁrms’.
The number of ﬁrms in the mixed oligopoly is less than one in the pure oligopoly.11 This implies
that EMF < EPF.12 Hence, D(EMF;°) ¡ D(EPF;°) is negative. Proposition 5 implies that even if
the public ﬁrm’s proﬁt is negative, the privatization policy may harm the social welfare. This result
is related to Proposition 3 of Matsumura and Kanda (2005). They show that the privatization policy
is preferable if and only if the proﬁt of the public ﬁrm is positive. The important diﬀerence between
our model and theirs is the existence of externality. There exists no externality in the model of
Matsumura and Kanda (2005), while there exists the negative externality in our model. The results
of them and Proposition 5 suggest that the existence of the negative externality allows the negative
proﬁt of the public ﬁrm.
We give a further remark. In the our model, all ﬁrm have identical technology. For this case,
W MF > W PF always holds.13 We explain why this holds. Since C00 > 0, P = C0(qs) implies that
Pqs ¡C(qs) ¸ Pq¡C(q) for all q. The equality holds iﬀ q = qs. P > C0(qp) implies qs 6= qp. Hence,
by the zero proﬁt condition, Π0 = Pqs¡C(qs) > Pqp¡C(qp) = 0. Since D(EMF;°)¡D(EPF;°) < 0,
W MF > W PF. This result does not hold when the public ﬁrm’s technology is diﬀerent from private
ﬁrms’.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigated a mixed market industry in which the production process generates
emissions and considered whether a public ﬁrm should be privatized. We ﬁnd that the privatization
policy is detrimental to welfare in an industry in which the degree of negative externality is suﬃciently
high, even if the market is suﬃciently competitive.
It is noteworthy that under high negative externality, a mixed oligopoly has two advantages over
a pure oligopoly in the terms of social welfare. First, since the public ﬁrm considers environmental
damage, the damage is smaller in a mixed oligopoly. Second, if the negative externality is high,
the public ﬁrm reduces its excess production. As a result, the public ﬁrm’s level of technology
declines and this causes production substitution from the public ﬁrm to private ﬁrms. Since in
a private ﬁrm, price is necessarily higher than the marginal cost; thus, in a mixed market, the
production level of private ﬁrms is relatively low from the perspective of social welfare. Therefore,
in the short-run analysis, production substitution improves the welfare. On the other hand, in the
long-run analysis, where the number of private ﬁrms is endogenous, this welfare-improving eﬀect of
production substitution is not exist.
11In the proof of Proposition 5, we show that the total output and the output of each private ﬁrm in the mixed
oligopoly are same as those in the pure oligopoly. This implies the price does not change by the privatization in
the long-run. P = C0(qs) and P > C0(qp) implies qs > qp. The number of private ﬁrms in the mixed oligopoly is
(Q¡qs)=qp, so the number of ﬁrms is (Q¡qs)=qp +1. On the other hand, the number of ﬁrms in the pure oligopoly
is Q=qs. (Q ¡ qs)=qp + 1 = Q=qs ¡ qs=qp + 1 < Q=qs.
12Note that each private ﬁrm choose the maximum emission level ¯ e, while the public ﬁrm may choose e0 < ¯ e.
13This result is related to Proposition 4 of Matsumura and Kanda (2005).
7Appendix
Proof of Proposition1. (i)(ii)(iv) From equations(2)(3)(4), by using the implicit function theorem,
we can obtain the following:
0
@
J P 00q + P 0 0
NP 0 P 0 ¡ Cqq ¡Ceq

















where J = NP 00q + (N + 1)P 0 ¡ Cqq. Since J = N(P 00q + P 0) + P 0 ¡ Cqq, by assumptions, J < 0.
















(P 0 ¡ Cqq)DE°J ¡ NP 0DE°(P 00q + P 0)
∆
=
P 0DE°(P 0 ¡ Cqq) ¡ CqqDE°J
∆
where ∆ = J £ f(¡Cee ¡ DEE)(P 0 ¡ Cqq) ¡ C2
eqg ¡ NP 0(¡Cee ¡ DEE)(P 00q + P 0). Note that
∆ = Jf¡Cqq(¡Cee ¡ DEE) ¡ C
2





= Jf¡Cqq(¡Cee ¡ DEE) ¡ C
2




= Jf¡Cqq(¡Cee ¡ DEE) ¡ C
2
eqg + (¡Cee ¡ DEE)P
0(P
0 ¡ Cqq):
By our assumptions, we have that J < 0, ¡Cqq(¡Cee¡DEE)¡C2
eq > 0, ¡Cee¡DEE > 0, P 0 < 0,
and P 0 ¡ Cqq > 0. Hence, ∆ < 0.
Since CeqDE°(P 00q+P 0) > 0 and DE°CeqJ > 0, we obtain that
dqp¤
d° > 0 and
dqs¤
d° < 0, respectively.
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p¤¤ ¡ C(¯ e;q
p¤¤) = 0: (14)
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Since dQ¤¤=d° = dqs¤¤=d° + qp¤¤dN¤¤=d°, we obtain the result.










































(Cqq(Cee + DEE) ¡ C
2
eq) ¡ ¯ eDEE
´
= DE°: (22)
Since (Cqq(Cee + DEE) ¡ C2
eq) > 0 and Ceq < 0 by assumptions, we have that
q
Ceq(Cqq(Cee + DEE) ¡
C2
eq) ¡ ¯ eDEE < 0. Hence, we obtain that dqs¤¤=d° < 0.
(iv) By equation (19) and (iii) of Proposition 3, we obtain this result.
(v) By equation (17) and (iii) of Proposition 3, we obtain this result.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. First, we show that the total output QMF in the mixed market is equal to
the total output QPF in the pure market. In the pure oligopoly, the number of private ﬁrms and
the private ﬁrm’s output is derived from (11) (14) by setting qs = 0. In the proof of Lemma 3,
the private ﬁrm’s output qp is independent of the public ﬁrm’s output qs. Hence, in the free-entry
equilibrium, the privatization does not change the private ﬁrm’s output, i.e., qp = qp¤¤. In the





This equation implies that if the private ﬁrm’s output does not change, the total output does not
change. Hence, the privatization does not change the total output.
Next, we prove the statement of proposition. Remind that social welfare consists of consumer
surplus, ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and the environmental damage. Since the privatization does not change
the total output, consumer surplus in the mixed oligopoly is same as one in the pure oligopoly.
Moreover, proﬁts of private ﬁrms is always zero in the free-entry equilibrium. These conditions
imply that W MF > W PF if and only if Π0 > D(EMF;°) ¡ D(EPF;°). Q.E.D.
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Figure 2: An example of cost function in footnote 4: ¯e = 5;a = 4
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